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We estimate the early effects of the pilot project to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation (REDDþ) in the Brazilian Amazon. This project offers a mix of interventions, includ-
ing conditional payments, to reduce deforestation by smallholders who depend on swidden agricul-
ture and extensive cattle ranching. We collected original data from 181 individual farmers. We use
difference-in-difference (DID) and DID-matching approaches and find evidence that supports our
identification strategy. We estimate that an average of 4 ha of forest were saved on each participating
farm in 2014, and that this conservation came at the expense of pastures rather than croplands.
This amounts to a decrease in the deforestation rate of about 50%. We find no evidence of
within-community spillovers.
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Tropical deforestation and degradation play
an important role in anthropic emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2), with an annual emis-
sion rate estimated at 7% to 14% of global
CO2 emissions (Harris et al. 2012; Grace,
Mitchard, and Gloor 2014). For many years
now, programs and policies designed to re-
duce tropical deforestation have featured
highly on the political agenda. Afforestation
and reforestation projects were included in
the Clean Development Mechanism of the
Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 and a mecha-
nism aimed at Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation, known as RED, was estab-
lished during the 11th Conference of the
Parties of Montreal in 2005 and later ex-
panded and renamed REDDþ to include
forest degradation and the enhancement of
forest carbon stocks.
Among forested countries worldwide,
Brazil has been one of the main sources of
global tree cover loss (Hansen et al. 2013). In
Brazil, the implementation of command-and-
control measures, the expansion of protected
areas, and interventions in the soy and beef
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supply chains, such as the Soy Moratorium
established in 2006, have significantly curbed
deforestation in the Amazon in recent years.
Between 2005 and 2013, the annual defores-
tation rate in Brazil fell by 70% (Nepstad
et al. 2014). Early access to satellite imagery,
made possible by the Brazilian government’s
historical interest in space technologies, has
been key to this success by improving the
government’s capacity to monitor forest
cover.
Despite this overall improvement, defores-
tation rates have continued at 5,000–7,000
km2 per year since 2009 (Godar et al. 2014)
and increased in 2015–2016 according to the
Brazilian National Space Research Institute.
Furthermore, the reduction in deforestation
achieved prior to 2009 can mainly be attrib-
uted to large farms, as evidence shows that
small farms had a limited role in the improve-
ments recorded during this period (Godar
et al. 2014). After a decade of command-and-
control regulation, it is often argued in the lit-
erature that new mechanisms targeting small
landowners are required to achieve further
reductions in deforestation in the Amazon
(Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Ezzine-de-Blas
et al. 2011; Gebara and Thault 2013; Godar
et al. 2014; Bo¨rner, Marinho, and Wunder
2015).
In this context, there has been a prolifera-
tion of subnational REDDþ initiatives in the
Brazilian Amazon, which consist of a mix of
incentives, disincentives, and enabling meas-
ures such as tenure clarification (Sills et al.
2014; Duchelle et al. 2014a). According to
Sunderlin and Sills (2012), most subnational
REDDþ initiatives are hybrids of the inte-
grated conservation and development project
(ICDP) approach and of new forest conserva-
tion approaches, such as Payments for
Environmental Services (PES). Around half
of the REDDþ projects implemented world-
wide include a component of payment to lo-
cal communities (Simonet et al. 2014). Brazil
hosts some of the most emblematic subna-
tional PES-based REDDþ initiatives, includ-
ing the Bolsa Floresta Program (Bo¨rner et al.
2013; Viana et al. 2013) and Acre’s State
System of Incentives for Environmental
Services (SISA; Duchelle et al. 2014b).
A question of primary importance is there-
fore: to what extent can a REDDþ project
that includes a PES component contribute to
avoided deforestation? There are a variety of
reasons why voluntary programs like PES-
based REDDþ projects may not be effective
in curbing deforestation. Firstly, farmers who
face the lowest costs for decreasing deforesta-
tion are the most likely to enter such a proj-
ect (Persson and Alpizar 2013). As a result,
the project may end up paying some farmers
for doing nothing differently from what they
would have done in the absence of any pay-
ment. In this case, the impact of the project
may be quite small. Secondly, the impact of
the project, if there is any, may be offset by
negative within-community spillovers (or
leakage). Negative within-community spill-
overs occur when the project happens to in-
crease deforestation among non-participants
through market equilibrium effects such as a
change in the demand for cattle products, or
when a forest-owner shifts all planned defor-
estation activities from a PES-enrolled plot
to a non-PES-enrolled plot (Dyer et al. 2012).
In the most extreme cases, for example, if
some landowners use all PES payments to
buy chainsaws to clear more forest for cattle
pasture, negative spillovers could exceed the
positive impacts of the project (Wunder
2007).
In this article, we evaluate the effectiveness
of an early REDDþ project launched along
the Transamazon Highway in the Brazilian
Amazon. Since 2012, this REDDþ project,
called Projeto Sustainable Settlements in the
Amazon (PAS), has offered a mix of inter-
ventions to reduce deforestation rates, in-
cluding PES and free administrative support,
to 350 smallholders in several communities in
the state of Para. We estimate the impact of
the project on participants, along with within-
community spillovers, and use these esti-
mates to calculate the cost of avoiding CO2
emissions in this project. We collected land
use data from a sample of 181 households in
four intervention communities and four com-
parison communities (where the project was
not offered) in 2010, as a baseline, and in
2014, that is, about two years after the begin-
ning of the project and one year after the
signing of PES contracts by local farmers.
Since the final survey was run just before the
payment of the first contract year, we are not
able to assess how the influx of cash (through
PES) into the local economy could affect de-
forestation rates. Therefore, any impact of
the PES component could be due to the fact
that enrolled participants reduced deforesta-
tion activities in anticipation of their contrac-
tual payments.
Intervention communities were not ran-
domly selected and participants in
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intervention communities self-selected into
the project given its voluntary nature. To
deal with this issue, we use the difference-in-
difference (DID) and DID-matching
approaches, with evidence supporting the
parallel trend assumption that both groups
follow the same trend during the pre-
treatment period. We estimate the impact of
the project on participants and show that an
average of approximately 4 hectares of forest
were conserved by each participating farm
compared to the counterfactual scenario with
no PAS project. Although the respondents’
statements about land use indicate that forest
cover continues to decline in both participant
and control groups after 2010, we highlight a
clear break in the trend of deforestation rates
among participants, which we attribute to the
project. After 2010, the deforestation rate
among participants decreases to 1.8% per
year, which means that the project led to an
approximate decrease of 50% in the average
deforestation rate (compared to the counter-
factual deforestation rate).1 Moreover, we
show that this decrease in deforestation
occurs at the expense of pastures versus crop-
lands. We find no evidence of within-
community spillovers. Finally, we convert the
impact of the project in terms of avoided
CO2 emissions and find that the project led to
the reduction of around 639,000 tons of CO2
over the first two years of implementation,
resulting in a cost of 0.84 USD per avoided
ton of CO2 emissions.
Although more than 300 REDDþ projects
have been implemented across the tropics
(Simonet et al. 2014), impact evaluations of
REDDþ projects are still scarce (Bo¨rner
et al. 2013; Temu et al. 2015; Sharma et al.
2017). Research based on local perceptions
highlights that households involved in
REDDþ projects are generally satisfied with
the results (Viana et al. 2013; Atela et al.
2015; Brimont et al. 2015), yet deforestation
rates based on satellite imagery indicates that
the effects of REDDþ projects on deforesta-
tion, if any, may be too small to be detectable
at the community level (Bos et al. 2017).
Apart from REDDþ, there have been
rigorous impact assessments of several PES
programs for forest conservation or reforesta-
tion (see Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro
2010, Samii et al. 2014, Alix-Garcia and
Wolff 2014 or Bo¨rner et al. 2016 for reviews
of the literature). Most studies are quasi-
experimental analyses conducted in Costa
Rica (Sanchez-Azolfeifa et al. 2007;
Arriagada et al. 2012; Garbach, Lubell, and
DeClerck 2012; Robalino and Pfaff 2013) and
Mexico (Honey-Roses, Baylis, and Ramirez
2011; Scullion et al. 2011; Alix-Garcia,
Shapiro, and Sims 2012; Sims et al. 2014;
Alix-Garcia, Sims, and Ya~nez-Pagans 2015;
Costedoat et al. 2015). Overall, the results of
these studies suggest that the impact of PES
on the average annual forest cover varies sub-
stantially across regions. Impacts are positive
and significant mainly in areas where land-
owners face medium to low opportunity costs
to participate in the projects (Bo¨rner et al.
2016), with no clear evidence of complemen-
tarity between conservation and poverty re-
duction goals (Samii et al. 2014). In most
cases, deforestation and forest degradation
are reduced but not halted. Finally,
Jayachandran et al. (2017) performed an in-
novative randomized-controlled trial to as-
sess the impact of a PES program for forest
conservation in western Uganda, and found
that tree cover declined by 4.2% during the
study period in treatment villages, compared
to 9.1% in control villages.
Our contribution to this literature is three-
fold. First, we evaluate a REDDþ pilot proj-
ect, for which the impact evaluation
literature is scarce, in the country with the
highest deforestation globally; 984,000 hec-
tares annually during 2010–2015 FAO (2015).
Second, we draw inferences about the causal
effect of the program from observational
data, which is challenging (Athey and Imbens
2017). To do so, we use DID and DID-
matching approaches and we provide supple-
mentary analyses that support our choice of
identification strategy. Third, we estimate not
only the additionality and leakage effects of
the program, but also the mechanisms
through which program participants have re-
duced their deforestation, thus addressing a
current gap in the impact evaluation litera-
ture (Bo¨rner et al. 2017).
The remainder of the article is structured
as follows. The subsequent section presents
the project under study and the underlying
mechanisms through which the project might
achieve forest conservation, that is, a theory
1 In this article, the annual deforestation rate is calculated us-
ing the definition employed by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations and identified by Puyravaud
(2003) as the most commonly used definition in the literature:
q ¼  A1A2
  1
t1t2  1
 
, where A1 and A2 are the forest area at time
t1 and t2, respectively.
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of change. The next section presents the data
collection process, followed by a section on
the estimation methodology. The impact
evaluation results are presented in the sub-
sequent section, followed by a section
illustrating our calculations regarding the
costs of avoided CO2 emissions. The last
section concludes.
The PAS Project Strategy to Achieve
Conservation
AMulticomponent Project
The PAS project is a REDDþ project imple-
mented by a Brazilian non-governmental or-
ganization, the Amazon Environmental
Research Institute (IPAM), which is a recog-
nized national actor in the design and imple-
mentation of REDDþ in Brazil (Gebara
et al. 2014). The PAS started in 2012 and was
financed by the Amazon Fund through 2017.
The participants in the project live in 13 set-
tlements located in the municipalities of
Anapu, Pacaja, and Senador Jose Porfırio,
near the BR-230 Trans-Amazonian Highway,
an area with high past and present levels of
deforestation. Agricultural settlers arrived in
the area in the 1970s during the early stages
of the National Integration Plan for the colo-
nization of the Brazilian Amazon. The liveli-
hoods of small landowners in this area still
depend on swidden agriculture and extensive
cattle ranching, which are the two primary
drivers of deforestation (Smith et al. 1996;
Soares-Filho et al. 2006).
Until recently, the Brazilian Institute for
the Environment and Renewable Natural
Resources (IBAMA), the national environ-
mental and legal enforcement authority, pri-
marily targeted areas dominated by larger
properties. In 2008, the government black-
listed multiple municipalities in the Amazon
where deforestation was particularly preva-
lent. In blacklisted municipalities, law en-
forcement and monitoring activities were
intensified, and economic sanctions and polit-
ical pressures were also imposed (Assunc¸~ao
and Rocha 2014), successfully reducing defor-
estation in the targeted municipalities
(Cisneros, Zhou, and Bo¨rner 2015). The
three municipalities in our study were added
to the blacklist in 2009 and 2012, and moni-
toring of small landholders in the
Transamazon region intensified as of 2012.
Nevertheless, small landowners in black-
listed municipalities often continue to clear
and burn forest to subsist. One objective of
the PAS project was to provide technical as-
sistance to these smallholders to help them
comply with the law and engage in a without-
fire agricultural transition. In fact, PAS built
on a similar program called Proambiente,
which was launched in 2003 and ended in
2006 due to funding cuts, after only six
months of payments to local farmers (Bartels
et al. 2010). Hence, an important objective of
the PAS project was to build on the experi-
ence of Proambiente to facilitate a transition
towards more sustainable agricultural practi-
ces by helping smallholders to intensify crop
and livestock farming. We define the PAS
project as a multi-component REDDþ proj-
ect mixing incentives, disincentives and en-
abling measures, which is typical of many
subnational REDDþ projects and programs
globally (Sills et al. 2014; Duchelle et al.
2017). The PAS project combines four main
components.
The first component is awareness-raising
meetings about the Brazilian Forest Code,
which requires that private properties located
in the Amazon maintain at least 80% of land
as forest (Legal Reserve). In some so-called
Environmental Economic Zoning (or ZEE,
for Zoneamento Ecologico Econoˆmico)
areas, such as the area of implementation of
the PAS project, the Legal Reserve has been
lowered to 50% to encourage economic de-
velopment. The Forest Code also requires
conservation of permanently protected areas
(hilltops, mountain slopes, mangroves, and ri-
parian forests) to preserve biodiversity, main-
tain water quality, and stabilize soils. The
second component is administrative support
for registration under the Rural
Environmental Registry (or CAR, for
Cadastro Ambiental Rural). The third compo-
nent is support for compliance with the
Forest Code through a PES scheme, while
the fourth component is support for the adop-
tion of sustainable livelihoods systems (in-
cluding agroforestry, intensive cattle
ranching, and fish farming) through direct
cash payments and free investments in tech-
nical assistance, farm inputs (seeds, fertilizer
and crop protection), equipment, and mar-
keting of local production.
The payments offered to project partici-
pants are conditional on both forest conser-
vation and agricultural transition toward a
fire-free production system: 30% of the
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payment is contingent upon forest conserva-
tion on at least 50% of land as Legal
Reserve; another 30% is contingent on the
conservation of 15 meter-wide forest riparian
zones; and the remaining 40% depends on
the adoption of fire-free production systems.
A minimum of 30% of forest cover is re-
quired to be eligible for payments, but only
participants with at least 50% of forest cover
can receive the full amount. The project thus
exceeds the requirements of the 2012 amend-
ments to the Brazilian Forest Code, which al-
low properties smaller than 400 hectares to
maintain only the forest cover they had in
July 2008. The payments provide an incentive
to respect the old Forest Code in the ZEE
(50% forest cover), and thus sets targets that
go beyond current legal requirements. The
PES component involves the creation of indi-
vidual land use plans that display the spatial
distribution of the new productive systems.
The project indicates that the annual pay-
ment may reach a maximum of $626 when all
criteria are met, which is determined by the
project proponent through annual field moni-
toring.2 This was also the mean amount re-
ceived through the government-sponsored
Bolsa Familia social program by the house-
holds in our sample in 2014, and around 15%
of the value of their agricultural production
this same year. In 2014, the transition towards
more sustainable agricultural systems was not
yet a requirement for receiving the payment.
The proportionality rule was exempted by
IPAM given the delay in the implementation
of the fire-free productive systems. The whole
2014 payment was thus made conditional on
forest conservation only. Our analysis focuses
on the impacts of the project on farm-level
forest cover.
Strategy to Reduce Deforestation
The PAS project was implemented in a con-
text that may have boosted households’ par-
ticipation. First, the federal policy of
municipal blacklisting created a generalized
fear of inspection and punishment. Farmers
aware of the blacklist and vulnerable to in-
spection may have seen participation in the
project as a way to comply with the law
(Cisneros, Zhou, and Bo¨rner 2015). Second,
the earlier implementation of Proambiente
helped cultivate pro-environmental motiva-
tions among farmers (Ezzine-de Blas,
Corbera, and Lapeyre 2015). The strategy
that we use to identify the impact of PAS
considers both contextual elements, as de-
scribed below. Each of the three components
of PAS could potentially lead to a reduction
in deforestation by participants. With regard
to the first component, the awareness-raising
meetings might have improved farmers’
knowledge of the Forest Code. Although
landholders are generally aware of the exis-
tence of IBAMA, they are not always famil-
iar with the details of the legislation and
possible sanctions. Access to new informa-
tion, combined with the generalized rumor of
increased command-and-control in the mu-
nicipalities, could foster compliance with the
law (Cisneros, Zhou, and Bo¨rner 2015;
Brandon et al. 2017). Regarding the second
component of the Rural Environmental
Registry (CAR) process, providing (publicly
available) information on property bound-
aries and its forest cover could enhance the
credibility of the command-and-control sys-
tem and encourage landowners to comply
with the law. A recent study, however, sug-
gests that CAR failed in halting illegal defor-
estation: although small landowners in
Eastern Amazonia were motivated to join
state land registries and decreased their de-
forestation directly after entering CAR, this
effect then decreased and even disappeared
in the case of Para (Azevedo et al. 2017). The
third component of the project (PES) is
expected to reduce deforestation because the
payment value was based on the opportunity
cost of maintaining forest on plots devoted to
cattle ranching and crops. Participants would
be paid only after compliance was verified by
IPAM through field visits and satellite
images. By binding contract conditionality,
farmers have the incentive to protect their
forests Wunder (2015). However, the impact
of the payment might be heterogeneous
among participants, those being closer to the
threshold of 50% of forest cover having
more incentives to reduce deforestation
than those lying well over 50%. The influx of
cash generated by the PES component could
also have an impact on participants and
their forests, depending on how it is used
(Dyer et al. 2012). For example, Alix-Garcia
et al. (2013) show that a conditional cash
transfer program (not a PES scheme) called
“Opportunidades”, implemented in Mexico,
2 1,680 Reais is converted to USD by applying a conversion
rate of 0.3724 (average conversion rate of Brazilian Real to U.S.
dollars in 2014).
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resulted in marginally higher deforestation
rates in localities that received cash transfer
payments due to increased local demand by
participants for land-intensive goods like beef
and milk.
Even without any influx of cash, several
types of spillovers might be expected from
the project, whether within or beyond inter-
vention communities. Within-community
spillover effects may occur when non-
participating farmers in intervention commu-
nities slow deforestation on their own plots if
they had the opportunity to attend
awareness-raising meetings and discuss land
use matters with participants. This may have
convinced some of the importance of respect-
ing the Forest Code even without the added
incentive of PES. Conversely, the project
may increase deforestation among non-
participants if commodity prices rise locally
(e.g., for cattle products) or if some partici-
pants compensate reduced production by
working as a laborer in deforesting the plots
of non-participant neighbors. This potential
leakage of deforestation could extend beyond
the borders of the intervention communities,
particularly through trade.
Data
The data were collected by the Center for
International Forestry Research (CIFOR), as
part of its Global Comparative Study (GCS)
on REDDþ launched in 2009 at 23 subna-
tional REDDþ sites in Brazil, Peru,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Cameroon, and
Tanzania. To select study communities,
IPAM indicated 13 communities where they
had previously implemented Proambiente
and planned to implement PAS. From this
pool, CIFOR field teams randomly selected
four intervention communities. The teams
then used pre-matching methods to identify
four comparison communities that were simi-
lar in terms of market accessibility, deforesta-
tion pressures, and socioeconomic factors
(Sunderlin et al. 2010) (see figure A1 in the
online supplementary appendix material). In
all communities, interviewed households
were selected randomly. In intervention com-
munities a disproportionate stratified random
sample was performed including households
that had previously participated in
Proambiente and those that had not (about
half in each group). A total of 181 households
were interviewed in two time periods. Of
these, 106 households were surveyed in the
intervention communities and 75 households
in the comparison communities. The first sur-
vey took place in June-July 2010, before the
PAS project began. The second survey took
place in February-March 2014, approximately
18 months after the official start of the proj-
ect. Two years after the first survey, about
10% of the households living in the interven-
tion communities became involved in the
PAS project. Because participants of
Proambiente were (intentionally) over-
represented in our sample, we ended up with
52 participants and 54 non-participants in
2014 (figure 1).
Our database includes variables related to
the pre-project and current periods. All data
was self-reported by the households during
the two surveys conducted in 2010 and 2014.
The forestland variable in 2008 was con-
structed from recall-type questions during the
2010 survey. To improve the reliability of de-
clarative data on land use, during both sur-
veys, each respondent was asked to draw a
detailed sketch of his or her landholding. The
independence between the research team in
the field (CIFOR) and the project proponent
(IPAM) was clearly stated at the beginning of
each meeting or interview. Participants were
also informed that their responses would re-
main anonymous. Two sections of the ques-
tionnaires are dedicated to the calculation of
agriculture and forest areas, which allows us
to cross-check reported land values.
Moreover, we could check that the reporting
of the areas under different land uses made
sense over time through clarifying any incon-
sistent values with respondents.
A potentially important caveat in our data
is the extent to which respondents might have
under-declared their actual deforestation. To
cross-check the validity of self-reported clear-
ing among participants, we used remotely-
sensed land use data for 2014 generated by
IPAM for a representative sample of 157
PAS participants. These data are available in
Pinto de Paulo Pedro (2016) and are based
on analysis of LANDSAT 8 images.3 The au-
thor calculated a mean forest cover (primary
and secondary) of 67% on an average total
3 IPAM technicians paid special attention to the issue of
clouds and cloud shadows: they used a specific method to re-
interpret cloud-covered areas and, when this was not feasible,
they went to the field to verify the land cover in question.
216 January 2019 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ajae/article-abstract/101/1/211/5039934 by C
IR
AD
 C
entre de C
ooperation Internationale en R
echerche Agronom
ique pour le D
eveloppem
ent user on 08 January 2019
farmland area of 78.6 ha. This matches well
with the self-reported data from our 2014 sur-
vey, from which we obtained a mean forest
cover of 66% for a total participant farm’s av-
erage land area of 79.3 ha (table 1, column 3).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the
intervention and the comparison groups in
2008, 2010, and 2014. The comparison group
(column 4) includes small rural families that
own less than 90 hectares on average and are
representative of the colonist small farmers
of the Transamazon highway (Moran 1981;
Perz, Walker, and Caldas 2006; Bo¨rner et al.
2010). In 2010, these landowners devoted
about 60% of their land to forest and about
30% to pasture. Most of the remaining land is
dedicated to the cultivation of rice, cassava,
or cocoa. While they derive income mainly
from crops and livestock, other sources such
as agricultural wage labor and government
social programs, particularly Bolsa Familia
and retirement pensions, are not negligible.
Column 1 of table 1 gives weighted statistics
for the intervention communities, taking into
account that the participants represent no
more than 10% of the household population
in intervention communities.4 Households in
intervention communities do not differ much
from households in comparison communities
in terms of mean age (about 51 years), educa-
tion (about 2.5 school years), family size
(about 5 members), and pre-project
deforestation: the share of forest cover de-
creased by 5% percentage points in both
groups between 2008 and 2010. However, in-
tervention communities start out with higher
forest cover and lower pasture shares in total
farmland, and higher wage revenues than
comparison communities. The two groups
also differ in land use changes over time, with
less conversion from forest to pasture in the
intervention communities between 2010 and
2014. Our goal is to assess the extent to which
such changes can be attributed to the PAS
project.
Empirical Strategy
Parameters of Interest
First and foremost, we aim to measure the
impact of the project on forest conservation
among participants. This impact is measured
as the average amount of forestland saved by
participating farmers as a result of the proj-
ect. We chose to estimate effects on forest
cover share because of the PES requirement
that farmers under contract must maintain at
least 50% of their landholdings under forest.
We then also express our impact analysis in
absolute hectares and in deforestation rates.
Finally, we check for within-community spill-
over effects, that is, PAS-induced changes in
the amount of forestland owned by non-
participating farmers who reside in interven-
tion communities.
To determine the average amount of for-
estland conserved among participants as a re-
sult of the PAS project, we need to calculate
Figure 1. Sample composition
4 We assign to the participants a weight equal to 0.20 and to
non-participants a weight equal to 1.76. These weights are
obtained by dividing the population percentage by the corre-
sponding sample percentage.
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the difference between the amount of forest-
land observed on participating farms in 2014
and the amount of forestland that would have
been observed in those farms in 2014, had
they not been involved in the project. This is
the so-called average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT), defined as ATT¼
Eðy1  y0jD ¼ 1Þ, where y1 denotes the
amount of a farmer’s forestland in the pres-
ence of the project, y0 denotes the amount of
a farmer’s forestland in the absence of the
project, and D is a dummy variable that
takes on the value of one when the farmer
participated in the project and zero other-
wise. We use DID and DID-matching meth-
ods to estimate the outcome level in the
unobserved state, namely Eðy0jD ¼ 1Þ.
We use households from the comparison
communities to construct valid control
groups. Those estimators allow us to take
into account possible heterogeneous impacts
among participants.
To understand which project components
could be driving the observed impact, it is im-
portant to know which interventions partici-
pants were exposed to. As figure 1 shows,
almost all beneficiaries of the PES compo-
nent also participated in the information
meetings and were registered under the
CAR. However, most farmers in the compar-
ison group were also in the process of regis-
tration under the CAR in 2014. Therefore,
any land use impact of the project may be
due to the meetings and PES components
only. Similarly, IBAMA’s command-and-
control regulation affected all communities in
the sample, whether intervention or control,
since all were in blacklisted municipalities.
Regarding the PES component, as mentioned
earlier, the final survey was run just before
the first contractual payment. Therefore, any
impact of this component would be due to
participants reducing deforestation activities
according to their signed contracts, and in an-
ticipation of the payments.
DID and DID-Matching Approaches
We first apply the DID treatment effect
estimator by regressing Dy on D. The DID es-
timator is commonly used in evaluation work,
and measures the impact of the program inter-
vention by the difference in the before-after
change in outcomes between participant and
comparison groups (Todd 2007). Using DID
requires a parallel trend assumption, which
says that both groups follow the same trend
during the pre-treatment period. In the pre-
sent study, this assumption can be tested using
a placebo test that applies the DID estimator
to the change in the outcome over 2008–2010,
when no effect should be detected.
As a robustness check, we then use various
DID-matching estimators as well as linear
models. Matching eliminates selection bias
due to observable factors X by comparing
treated farmers to observationally identical
untreated ones (Imbens 2004). Moreover, the
DID-matching estimator allows for temporally
invariant differences in outcomes between
participants and their X-matched untreated
counterparts. Applied to our data, this identifi-
cation strategy consists of comparing the
change in participants’ forest cover between
2010 and 2014 with the change in forest cover
among matched untreated farmers from com-
parison communities. In addition to the paral-
lel trend assumption, DID-matching requires
a selection on observables assumption
(Heckman and Robb 1985), which says that
the dependence between treatment assign-
ment and treatment-specific outcomes can be
entirely removed by conditioning on observ-
able variables. A crucial step to this end is
thus to measure all factors, X, that are likely
to drive both the decision to participate in the
PAS project as well as decisions regarding the
conservation of forestland.
It is important that the observable factors,
X, are not affected by the project (Imbens
2004), which is why we use pre-treatment val-
ues from 2010 (and from 2008 when avail-
able). We include in the set of observable
factors X extracted from the baseline 2010 sur-
vey: the total land area in hectares in 2010, the
amount of forestland as a share of the total
land area in 2010 and in 2008, the agricultural
land as a share of the total land area in 2010,
pastures as a share of the total land area in
2010, the market value of total agricultural
production in 2010 (which includes sales and
self-consumption), the market value of owned
livestock in 2010, the amount of other sources
of income received in 2010, such as those de-
rived from wage labor, government social pro-
grams, retirement pensions, and outside
businesses (in Reais), as well as family size
and the age and education level (in school
years) of the head of household.
Another key assumption for the validity of
the DID-matching approach is that the treat-
ment received by one farmer must not affect
the outcome of another farmer. This assump-
tion is referred to as the Stable-Unit-
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Treatment-Value-Assumption (Rubin 1978).
In our analysis, the validity of this assumption
is not likely to be threatened because the con-
nection between communities is extremely
limited due to the poor quality of transporta-
tion infrastructure.
We use the nearest-neighbor matching esti-
mator, which matches each participant to the
two and four closest untreated farmers from
the comparison communities, according to
the vector X, and three different propensity
score matching estimators applying the
matching procedure to the summary statistic
PrðDi ¼ 1jXiÞ, the so-called propensity score
(Abadie et al. 2004; Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983). We use the kernel-based propensity
score matching estimator and the propensity
score matching estimator using two or four
matched observations as controls.
Further, we use the asymptotically-consistent
estimator of the variance of the nearest-
neighbor matching and propensity score match-
ing estimators provided by Abadie and Imbens
(2006). In addition, we test for the autocorrela-
tion of the deforestation rates within communi-
ties and find that the size of the intra-cluster
correlation for this variable is small (3.5%).
This is not surprising, given that the farms are
distant from each other, many households are
recent migrants from different regions in Brazil,
and there is no head of village and few associa-
tions. We thus choose to ignore the correlation
at first and analyze the data in a standard way.
As a robustness check, however, we compute
some estimates for the clustered standard errors
of the coefficients. For the DID estimates, we
perform the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure,
as described by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
(2008), taking the so-called communities as
clusters. For DID-matching estimates, we boot-
strap the standard error of the estimates. Our
main results, albeit sometimes less precise, re-
main significant (see table A1 in the online sup-
plementary appendix material).
Finally, we use another, computationally
easier way to estimate the ATT, by regressing
Dy on D, controlling for the propensity score
(or for X). We run these linear regressions
as a robustness check. Just as in the DID re-
gression, we provide heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors.
Results of the Impact Evaluation
We first apply the DID estimator to our data
to estimate the average effect of the PAS
project on the forest cover of participant and
non-participant households in intervention
communities. We obtain a positive point esti-
mate (ATT equals 3.29 points of percentage),
but this result lacks precision (robust stan-
dard error equals 2.74, meaning that we fail
to reject the null of no impact). To further
study the likely effects of PAS, we thus turn
to the subset of households who chose to par-
ticipate in the project.
Project Enrollment
The proponent first offered the project to the
350 households who previously participated in
Proambiente, which explains why 80% of PAS
participants also participated in this previous
program. The reason that 20% of the previous
participants in Proambiente did not enroll in
the PAS project is unclear: some might have
moved away, while others might have been
disappointed by the early suspension of
Proambiente, or perhaps considered that the
PES compensation was an insufficient incen-
tive. This enrolment process might have led to
a particular profile of participants. We thus
start our analysis by comparing participating
and non-participating households (living in in-
tervention communities). As shown in table 1,
participants (column 3) did not differ signifi-
cantly from non-participants in terms of the
share of forest cover (about 75% of the land
area in 2008 and 70% in 2010), cropland
(about 8%), or pasture land (around 20%).
However, participating households on average
had smaller plots, owned less livestock, and
earned more money from wage labor (e.g., ag-
ricultural labor) than non-participating house-
holds (column 2) before the start of the
project. These features will thus play a central
role in the matching procedure that follows.
Impacts on Participants’ Forest Cover
Comparing participants to the comparison
group in 2014, one can observe that partici-
pants have much higher forest cover—about
13 percentage points more. This difference ob-
viously cannot be interpreted as the ATT,
since participants already had higher forest
cover before the start of the project. To esti-
mate the ATT, we apply the aforementioned
estimators to the group of participants using
the comparison group to estimate the counter-
factual level of forest cover. Applying the
DID-estimator only requires testing the paral-
lel trend assumption. Moreover, applying the
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DID-matching estimators requires computing
propensity scores and determining whether
the matching procedure performed well.
We start by computing conditional proba-
bilities for being enrolled in the project (or
propensity scores) by estimating a probit
model where the dependent variable is D and
which includes all of the aforementioned pre-
treatment covariates X presented in table 1.
Figure A2 in the online supplementary ap-
pendix material shows that densities in both
groups are high enough for a wide range of
propensity scores, meaning that the matching
procedure is likely to perform well.
We then compare the extent of balancing
between the participant and comparison
groups before and after the matching proce-
dure. We calculate the normalized difference
between these two groups for the pre-
treatment covariates X. The normalized dif-
ference is the difference in means divided by
the square root of the sum of variances for
both groups, and is the most commonly ac-
cepted diagnostic used to assess covariate
balance (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985; Stuart
2010). The normalized difference is consid-
ered negligible when it is below the suggested
rule of thumb of 0.25 standard deviations
(Rubin 2001; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
Column 5 of table 1 shows that, before
matching, the participant group (column 3)
differs significantly from the comparison
group (column 4) in terms of land use (nota-
bly forest cover and pasture land) and wage
income. Column 7 of table 1 reports the nor-
malized mean differences between partici-
pants and the constructed matched group
(column 6). All normalized differences are
below 0.25 standard deviations, which indi-
cates that the matching procedure was suc-
cessful in constructing a valid control group.
We then examine the validity of the parallel
trends assumption by running a placebo test
that applies the identification strategy to the
pre-treatment period of 2008–2010. As shown
in table A2 in the online supplementary ap-
pendix material, we find no significant differ-
ence in forest cover between households
enrolled in the project and households living
in comparison communities; we also do not
find any significant difference between partici-
pants and their matched counterparts. These
results indicate that the three groups (partici-
pants, comparison and matched) followed the
same trend before the project start, which sup-
ports our identification strategy, whether it is
the DID or the DID-matching approach. In
our sample, almost 80% of the participants in
the PAS project had previously participated in
the Proambiente project. Although previous
participation in the Proambiente project
explains participation in the PAS project, it
does not translate to any difference in defores-
tation rates between groups in the absence of
the project, as shown by the parallel trends be-
fore 2010. We can thus safely assume that par-
ticipation in the Proambiente project is not a
confounding variable in our framework.
The main results of the study—the effects
of the program among participants—are pre-
sented in table 2. Column 1 gives the estimates
of the impact of the project on forestland. In
the majority of cases, the impact is estimated
with precision. Using the smallest significant
impact estimator, which is the DID estimator,
the ATT equals 5.41 percentage points. The
ATT represents the difference in 2014 be-
tween the average land area devoted to forests
among participant farmers (65.93%) and the
average land area they would have devoted to
forests had they not participated. Given that
the average land area in participating farms
equals 79.28 hectares, an average of approxi-
mately 4.3 hectares of forests was saved on
each participating farm compared to the coun-
terfactual scenario of no project.
This result is shown graphically in figure 2.
We observe that the amount of forest cover con-
tinues to decline in both participant and control
groups after 2010. However, we see a clear
break in the deforestation trend among partici-
pants, which we can attribute to the PAS proj-
ect. After 2010, the deforestation rate among
participants decreased to 1.8%, which means
that the project led to an approximately 50%
decrease in the average deforestation rate in
these farms compared to the counterfactual de-
forestation rate, which is around 4% in 2014.
Finally, figure 2 shows that the average land-
owner from comparison communities nearly
reached the threshold of 50% of land as Legal
Reserve in 2014, and that the average PAS par-
ticipant would have crossed this threshold in just
a few years without the project.
Impacts on Livelihoods Portfolio
We then apply our identification strategy to the
total land area to check whether any change
should be detected and attributed to the proj-
ect. We did this because one might expect that
participants have increased the total land area
to comply with the requirements of the project
while clearing the same area of forest as those
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in the control group. We find no difference be-
tween participant and control groups in 2014
(see column 2 of table 2). We conclude that
less deforestation among participants
necessarily caused some changes to the way
that other owned land is used. We thus apply
our identification strategy to the proportion of
land devoted to crops and pastures. We find no
Table 2. Impact on Participants in 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator Forest cover (%) Total land (ha) Crop land (%) Pastures (%)
DID 5.41** 1.44 0.38 6.91**
2.71 5.72 1.58 2.74
DID-matching
NNM(4X) 7.10** 4.29 0.50 8.11***
3.21 7.17 2.46 3.07
NNM(2X) 10.66** 5.43 1.80 9.95**
4.99 8.43 2.81 4.31
PSM (kernel) 7.98* 2.28 1.39 11.32***
4.52 5.66 4.62 3.25
PSM(2N) 8.61** 1.50 1.50 11.70***
4.16 4.60 3.69 1.67
PSM(4N) 7.38* 6.79 0.37 9.39***
4.49 6.44 3.67 1.73
Linear regression
OLS(X) 6.22* 0.73 1.14 7.82***
3.23 5.98 1.91 2.97
OLS(PS) 6.068 0.26 0.54 7.15**
3.91 6.07 2.82 3.35
Mean value y1 65.93 79.28 9.34 21.77
Note: This table displays the average treatment effect on the treated, where the treated group refers to the participant group. Mean value y1 is the mean value
of the outcome in 2014 in the treated group. Forest cover, cropland, and pasture are expressed as a share of the total land area. The total land area is
expressed in hectares. Asterisks ***, **, and *, as well as 8 denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no impact at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% significance lev-
els, respectively. DID refers to the Difference-in-Differences estimator. NNM(4X) (resp.2X) refers to the nearest neighbor estimator using 4 (resp. 2)
matched observations as controls. PSM (kernel) refers to the kernel-based propensity score matching estimator. PSM(2N) (4N) refers to the propensity score
matching estimator using 2 (4) matched observations as controls. OLS(X) refers to the linear regression using ordinary least squares and controlling for X,
and OLS(PS) refers to the linear regression using ordinary least squares and controlling for the propensity score. Standard errors are in italics below
coefficients.
Figure 2. Forest cover as a share of land among participants
Note: This figure provides an illustration of the parallel trend assumption, as well as a representation of the DID estimator of the impact. It depicts the mean
value of the forest cover in the group of participants (52 households) and in the comparison group (75 households), in 2008, 2010, and 2014, as well as the
DID-estimate of the participants’ forest cover in 2014, had they not been participants (the counterfactual value)
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evidence of any impacts on cropland (see
column 3 of table 2). In contrast, we do find ev-
idence that the project had a significant impact
on the creation of pastures. Column 5 of table 2
displays the estimates of the impact of the proj-
ect on participants in terms of amount of total
land as pasture. Using the smallest significant
impact estimator, which is the DID estimator,
the ATT equals -6.91 percentage points. This
means that the creation of an average of
5.5 hectares of pastures have been avoided in
each participating farm compared to a scenario
without the PAS project. These results fit well
with our estimates of the project’s impact on
forest cover. We thus conclude that an average
of about 4 to 5 hectares of forest have been
saved on each participating farm in 2014, and
that this conservation came at the expense of
pastures rather than cropland.
Since participants did not receive the PES
component until 2014, we investigate whether
the changes in land use that occurred due to
the project, that is, more forests and less pas-
tures, prompted participating farmers to seek
alternative sources of income outside the
farm. To do so, we apply our identification
strategy to the variable that measured wage
labor in 2014. Most estimators do not allow
us to reject the null hypothesis of no impact
(see column 1 of table A3 in the online sup-
plementary appendix material). Thus, we are
not able to conclude that participants sought
new sources of income outside the farm at
this stage of the project.
Finally, we apply our identification strategy
to a cattle ranching intensification variable,
constructed as the ratio of the value of live-
stock to pasture area.5 The point estimate is
positive but lacks precision, and most of the
time we are not able to reject the null hypoth-
esis of no impact (see column 2 of table A3 in
the online supplementary appendix material).
Thus, our data do not allow us to determine
whether the participants in the project com-
pensated for forest conservation by intensify-
ing their livestock operations as a result of
the project.
Looking at the participant group, we can
thus safely conclude that the PAS project had
a significant impact on forest cover by curb-
ing deforestation, and that this change
occurred to the detriment of new pastures, not
cropland. On the contrary, we failed to detect
any significant impact on other variables like
livestock or wage labor outside the farm.
Assessing Spillovers
We now test for the presence of spillover
effects within intervention communities by
applying the DID and DID-matching estima-
tors to the non-participants living in these
communities. Again, we compute conditional
probabilities for this group (see the distribu-
tion of propensity scores in figure A3 in the
online supplementary appendix material).
We run the placebo test and conclude that
our identification strategy is also valid for this
group (see column 2 in table A2 in the online
supplementary appendix material). We also
run balancing tests before and after the
matching procedure and conclude that it per-
forms well (see table A4 in the online supple-
mentary appendix material). Column 1 of
table A5 in the online supplementary appen-
dix material shows the estimates of the im-
pact of the project on the forest cover of this
group. The null assumption of no impact can-
not be rejected whatever the estimator con-
sidered, which indicates that, if there is any
spillover effect, it is too small to be detected
using our data (see figure A4 in the online
supplementary appendix material). We also
do not find any significant impact on pastures
(column 2), cropland (column 3) or total land
area (column 4).
We also examine spillover effects of the
project to comparison communities, which
was another possible form of leakage. It
seems unlikely that comparison communities
faced higher compensatory demand for beef,
because cattle production did not decrease
significantly in intervention communities be-
cause of the project. Moreover, most of the
crop and small livestock production in our
sample is for subsistence use. Beef and cocoa
are the only products that are sold by a rela-
tively important share of the sample, with
around one third of the sample selling cattle
in 2010 (10 heads of livestock sold on aver-
age), and 44% selling cocoa (1.7 ton of cocoa
per seller on average). However, the quanti-
ties sold remain negligible compared to the
total production of beef (616,404 heads) and
cocoa (3,191 tons) registered by the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
in 2010 for the three municipalities covered
by the study. Thus, even large changes in the
5 The average value of all cattle owned by participants in 2014
is about 15,000 Reais, which corresponds to about 15 cows per
farm. In 2010, participants owned an average of about 11 cows
per farm.
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production of the 350 participants in the proj-
ect would have a negligible impact on the lo-
cal market.
Costs of Avoided CO2 Emissions
We take our main estimate of the impact of
the project on participants as a starting point
for calculating the averted CO2 emissions
generated by the project. Given that sampled
participants saved an average of approxi-
mately 4.3 ha of forest on their farm since the
beginning of the project in 2012, we scale up
this point estimate to the 350 households in-
volved in the project, assessing that a total of
1,505 hectares of forest were saved as a result
of the project.
Similar to Jayachandran et al. (2017), we
use satellite-based estimates of biomass in
forests, available at a 30-meter resolution and
provided by the World Resources Institute to
estimate the carbon in forestland in our study
area; the average is 116 tons of carbon per
hectare of forest with at least 50% tree cover.
We then calculate the impact of the forest-
land conserved in tons of CO2 (tCO2;
1 tC¼3.67 tCO2), and determine that the
PAS project led to 639,080 tCO2 in avoided
emissions (1,826 tCO2 per participant) over
two years.6
The total costs of the PAS project can be
estimated using the amount of PES disbursed
to participants in 2014 ($626 per participant,
which leads to a total of $219,100), plus start-
up as well as operational costs (the total costs
then reach $538,300, i.e., $1,538 per partici-
pant over two years). We estimate these costs
using information on project implementation
costs provided by Sills et al. (2014). This
amount is an estimate of the annual costs of
the project, based on the total budget pro-
vided by IPAM for the five years of the proj-
ect. More than half of the costs are dedicated
to community development (54%, including
PES, inputs, and technical assistance) while
finance and administration represent the
second-most important item (19%), followed
by policy and planning activities (10%), edu-
cation and communication (6%), and others
(methods development; measurement,
reporting and verification; 5%). Over the first
two years of the project, the total cost of the
project is thus $0.84 per tCO2 emissions
avoided. This number is nearly twice that es-
timated by Jayachandran et al. (2017) in
Uganda ($0.46 per tCO2), which may be due
to a higher focus on technical assistance in
the PAS project, and to relatively high costs
in Brazil.
Conclusion
Subnational REDDþ initiatives have
emerged in many areas around the world,
and particularly in Brazil. However, the
impacts of these projects and programs have
been largely under-studied. This article
addresses this gap by providing a robust im-
pact assessment of a REDDþ pilot project
that offers a PES scheme, along with techni-
cal and administrative support, to facilitate
farmer compliance with the Forest Code in
the Brazilian Amazon. Our main result (a
50% decrease in deforestation rates) suggests
that REDDþ projects that use a mix of
interventions—including incentives, disincen-
tives, and enabling measures—may constitute
a promising strategy to reduce deforestation
rates among small Amazonian landowners.
The long term on-the-ground presence of the
project proponent and the context of gradual
implementation of command-and-control
measures in the most remote areas probably
helped to obtain such encouraging results. It
should be noted, however, that at the time of
data collection the PAS project was still in
the early stages of implementation, and our
data do not allow us to determine whether
participants will be able to eliminate their re-
liance on deforestation activities altogether
by switching towards more sustainable agri-
cultural production systems before the proj-
ect’s expiration date. Our results indicate that
project participants were able to reduce their
deforestation activities by devoting less pas-
ture land to their cattle in the first year of the
project, and that they may not have reduced
their agricultural activity as a result of less
deforestation.
These results raise several questions. Will
participating farmers adopt more intensive
6 This estimate does not take into account potential reductions
in methane emissions, as we were not able to demonstrate a sig-
nificant impact of the project on cattle ranching activities.
Following the Tier 1 methodology provided by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, we assume that the
biomass after conversion from forest to pasture is zero (Verchot
et al. 2006). Moreover, as the literature on conversion from for-
estland to grassland in the tropics provides evidence for net gains
as well as net losses in soil carbon (Verchot et al. 2006), we do
not consider this component either.
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cattle ranching systems in the long run? As
extensive cattle ranching is a major driver of
deforestation in the study area, livestock in-
tensification appears to be a promising strat-
egy to reduce deforestation and constitutes
one of IPAM’s priorities, but may face some
limits if deforestation is to be further re-
duced. Are there other strategies available to
farmers that would enable them to reduce
their dependence on deforestation activities?
Among the possible alternative practices, the
expansion of cocoa production could be a
promising alternative to cattle ranching and
swidden agriculture, because cocoa is grown
in agroforestry systems (as such, it can be rec-
ognized as Legal Reserve) and has the poten-
tial to be more profitable than extensive
cattle ranching (Sablayrolles, Oliveria, and
Pinto 2012; Schneider et al. 2015). A limita-
tion, however, is that cocoa production
requires fertile soils, high start-up costs, and
technical agricultural support to obtain good
quality cocoa. Towards this end, the PAS
project includes provisions aimed at provid-
ing technical assistance and farm inputs for
the adoption of such sustainable practices.
An evaluation of the project over the long-
term could help assess participants’ ability to
eliminate their dependence on the deforesta-
tion of mature forest, switch toward more
sustainable agricultural production systems,
and enhance their subsistence livelihoods.
Understanding the effectiveness of direct
cash payments on smallholders’ conservation
decisions in the context of their broader strat-
egies is indeed fundamental to understanding
the implications of PES-based REDDþ ini-
tiatives in the long run.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material are available at
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
online.
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